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I. INTRODUCTION 
After Mack Brown resigned,1 the University of Texas (“Texas”) 
looked to hire a new head football coach for its premier college football 
program. The school set its eyes on Charlie Strong, head football coach 
for the University of Louisville. For Texas to successfully hire Strong, 
his contract required a buyout payment from Strong to the University 
of Louisville for $4.375 million.2 
In the world of athletics, this situation was not unusual:3 
typically, the new university employer reimbursed the coach for the 
 
 *  Harry W. Walborsky Professor, Florida State University College of Law.  
 1.  At the time, it was reported that the President of the University forced Mack Brown to 
resign. See Pat Forde, Source: Mack Brown Forced out as Texas Coach After President Withdrew 
Support, YAHOO! (Dec. 23, 2013), available at http://sports.yahoo.com/news/source--mack-brown-
forced-out-as-texas-coach-after-president-withdrew-support-005700558.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8UPN-BPK6 (last visited March 10, 2015 at 1:17 PM) (“[T]he 16-year Mack 
Brown Era at Texas was terminated not by the coach himself, but at the insistence of an 
embattled school president.”). 
 2.  See Steve Berkowitz, Schools Buying Coach’s Contracts Instead of Buying Out, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 19, 2014), available at   http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/11/19/ 
college-football-coaches-compensation-buyouts-texas-louisville-alabama/19271987/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5NY4-35JE (last visited March 10, 2015 at 1:20 PM) (describing the buyout of 
Charlie Strong’s contract with Louisville).  
 3.  See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Will the Tax Man Cometh to Coach Rodriguez, 
120 TAX NOTES 474 (2008) (describing the highly publicized move of Coach Richard Rodriguez 
from West Virginia University to the University of Michigan).  
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buyout or directly paid the buyout to the old university employer. 
Under either arrangement many schools took the position that such 
payments, whether made directly or as a reimbursement, were 
includible in the coach’s income for federal tax purposes.4 
The University of Texas, however, accomplished its desired 
result (hiring Strong as head football coach) in a seemingly unusual 
manner. Technically, no buyout payment was made. Instead, Texas, 
with the approval of Strong, purchased the rights to Strong’s 
employment contract from the University of Louisville.5 Texas claimed 
that no buyout payment was ever made because the contract was 
never bought out. Instead, Texas became Strong’s employer and then 
the two parties renegotiated Strong’s employment contract.6 The 
purchase price of the employment contract was exactly the same as 
the contractual buyout payment—$4.375 million.7 This was no 
coincidence and demonstrated that the true purpose of the payment 
was to “avoid taxes for coaches and schools.”8 
This Essay explains that such arrangements do not improve 
the prospects for excluding the payment from the coach’s taxable 
income. The taxation issue applies uniformly in a buyout, regardless 
of whether (i) the new university employer provides a direct payment, 
(ii) the new university employer reimburses the coach, or (iii) as the 
University of Texas recently did, the new university employer buys 
the employment contract from the old university employer. The 
substance of all three arrangements is identical. This does not lead to 
the conclusion that the buyout payment is taxable to the coach, 
however. Instead, as discussed in Part IV, there are two independent 
policy justifications that counsel against taxing the coach—regardless 
of which of the three arrangements is used. 
 
 4.  See Steve Berkowitz, Tax-Free Buyouts? Coaches Take a Chance with the IRS, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 6, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/11/06/ 
college-football-coach-pay-buyouts-taxes-irs/3449639/, archived at http://perma.cc/EK33-9UJH 
(last visited March 10, 2015 at 1:26 PM) (stating that the coaches faced responsibility for their 
contract buyouts). However, I argue that such payments should not be included in the coach’s 
income. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Tax Consequences When a New Employer Bears 
the Cost of the Employee’s Terminating a Prior Employment Relationship, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 539 
(2007). This debate is further explained infra Part IV. 
 5.  See Berkowitz, supra note 2 (detailing Charlie Strong’s signing with the University of 
Texas and buyout from the University of Louisville).  
 6.  The University of Louisville followed the same structure when it replaced Strong and 
hired its new head football coach, Bobby Petrino, from the University of Western Kentucky. The 
school also paid the exact buyout amount in order to purchase Petrino’s contract. Id.   
 7.  Id.   
 8.  Id. Since the “schools” are tax-exempt entities, it is not clear what taxes they are 
“avoiding.” One explanation is that since the coach avoids taxes, the school avoids having to 
gross up the reimbursement of the buyout.  
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II. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A BUYOUT: THE SERVICE’S POSITION 
It is well established under regulations promulgated by the 
Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) that an employee must 
include in income the payment or reimbursement of an employee’s 
personal obligation.9 In the typical buyout scenario, the coach pays the 
buyout directly to the old university employer and is then reimbursed 
by the new university employer. There is no question that the 
contractually required buyout payment is a personal obligation of the 
coach. 
Under this construct of the transaction, the coach may also 
deduct the cost of the buyout as a business expense under Internal 
Revenue Code § 162.10 Since the coach is allowed a deduction, it 
appears that it makes no difference to the coach whether he has 
income or not on account of the payment of the buyout. If that 
deduction were not subject to any limitation (i.e., if it were fully 
deductible), it would offset the coach’s income from the payment of the 
buyout and so it would make no difference to the coach whether the 
payment is excluded from his income or included in his income with 
an offsetting deduction. 
The problem, as discussed in more detail in Part III, is that the 
Service would likely take the position that the deduction should be 
classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.11 Miscellaneous 
itemized deductions are subject to several limitations. First, such 
deductions are deductible only to the extent that the aggregate 
amount exceeds two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.12  
Second, they are subject to the overall limitation on most itemized 
deductions under Internal Revenue Code § 68.13 Finally, the largest 
issue is that miscellaneous itemized deductions are completely 
disallowed for purposes of the Alternative Minimum Tax.14 With such 
 
 9.  See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 731 (1929) (holding that 
payment of income tax by an employer constitutes taxable income for the employee); see also Rev. 
Rul. 70-282, 1970-1 C.B. 16 (stating that an amount paid by an employer to cure an employee’s 
indebtedness is taxable income for the employee); Rev. Rul. 66-41, 1966-1 C.B. 233 (stating that 
an employment agency fee reimbursed by the employer is taxable income for the employee).  
 10.  26 U.S.C. § 162 allows individuals to deduct the cost of “ordinary and necessary” 
business expenses. A payment made to end an employment contract is deductible under Code § 
162. See Streger v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 227, 231 (1999) (allowing a taxpayer to deduct the full cost 
of malpractice insurance for his business in the year that his business terminated).  
 11.  See infra Part III (explaining the IRS’s likely position regarding the University of 
Texas’s purchasing of the employment contract rather than paying the buyout). 
 12.  26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (West 2012).  
 13.  If a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income for a taxable year exceeds an “applicable amount,” 
then certain itemized deductions (including all miscellaneous itemized deductions) will be 
reduced. See I.R.C. § 68 (West 2012).   
 14.  26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(I) (2012). 
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large buyout payments required for many coaches, it is almost certain 
that these coaches will be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax 
system. Therefore, under this interpretation of the tax results, there 
are likely two unfavorable outcomes: either the deduction for the 
buyout would not completely wash out the new employer’s 
reimbursement or the buyout would not be deductible at all. 
III. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF PURCHASING THE CONTRACT: THE 
SERVICE’S LIKELY POSITION 
There is an argument that the University of Texas’s new 
arrangement—purchasing the employment contract rather than 
paying the buyout—may allow the coach to exclude the buyout 
payment from his or her income. The coach could argue that the 
contractual buyout was never paid and the transaction was solely 
between the new and old universities. Since the buyout was not paid, 
the new university employer never paid a personal obligation of the 
coach. Thus, the argument goes, there is no income to the coach and 
the tax issue is avoided. 
The Service, however, is unlikely to agree with this position.15 
Under the doctrine of substance over form,16 the Service will 
 
 15.  There is an interesting question as to the tax consequences for Strong in the unlikely 
circumstance that the Service were to accept the form of the transaction. Somewhat surprisingly, 
it has been reported that the University of Texas did not impose a buyout provision when it 
renegotiated Strong’s contract (other than for some assistant coach salaries that would still be 
due). See Chris Hummer, Charlie Strong: How Does the Contract of Texas’ New Coach Compare 
with Texas A&M’s Kevin Sumlin’s Deal, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014), available 
at http://collegesportsblog.dallasnews.com/2014/01/charlie-strong-how-does-the-contract-of-texas-
new-coach-compare-with-texas-ams-kevin-sumlins-deal.html/, archived at http://perma.cc/U74L-
3XWC. There is a question then of whether removing the buyout provision from the prior 
contract would trigger cancellation of debt income to Strong. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 61(a)(12), 108 
(2012) (detailing discharge of indebtedness). There is an exclusion, however, of cancellation of 
debt income if payment of the debt would have been deductible. 26 U.S.C. § 108(e)(2) (2012). The 
question is whether that exclusion applies only if the payment would have been fully 
deductible—that is whether it applies to a deduction whose amount is subject to restrictions. As 
noted in this Essay, an unreimbursed buyout payment by Strong would be characterized as a 
miscellaneous itemized deduction and would, at best, be subject to limitations and, at worst, be 
fully disallowed under the Alternative Minimum Tax system. The author believes that the 
exclusion applies to all deductible items regardless of whether they are subject to limitations, 
but that is an open question. Also note that even if the University of Texas had imposed the 
same dollar amount of buyout requirement as was in the contract with the University of 
Louisville, Strong would have had cancellation of debt income because the cancelled debt was 
owed immediately whereas the new buyout debt would be both in the future and contingent.   
 16.  When a transaction or series of steps to a transaction have no economic significance 
and are designed to obtain favorable tax consequences, the tax law will recharacterize the 
transaction (or the steps) so as to reflect the economic substance of what was accomplished. See 
Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 228, 265–66 (2009) rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Consol. Edison Co. of New York & Subsidiaries v. United States, 703 F.3d 
1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The substance over form doctrine requires the courts to determine 
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presumably recharacterize the transaction to reflect the economic 
substance of the deal. In this case, the substance of the transaction is 
clear: the new university employer paid the buyout, thereby allowing 
the coach to be hired. It will bolster the Service’s argument that the 
“purchase price” of the contract was exactly equal to the required 
contractual buyout requirement. 
Therefore, it makes little difference for federal income tax 
purposes how the universities and the sought-after coach structure 
the transaction. Under all three arrangements discussed in this 
Essay,17 the economic substance of the deal is the same: the new 
university employer is satisfying the personal obligation of the coach 
in order to allow the coach to terminate his old employment contract 
and sign a new one with the new university. The University of Texas’s 
unusual arrangement has not solved the tax “problem” (if one exists). 
In other words, assuming the Service’s position is correct, the result 
will be the same regardless of the arrangement—the coach will have 
income in the form of a personal obligation satisfied by the new 
university and the coach’s corresponding business deduction for that 
payment will be classified as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. To 
the contrary, as discussed below, there are policy justifications for 
excluding the buyout payment from a coach’s income.18 Again the 
structure of the deal should not affect the tax consequences. Therefore, 
if either of the policy justifications is correct, a coach will not have 
income for the buyout payment regardless of how the deal is 
structured. 
IV. REASONS TO EXCLUDE INCOME 
A. Non-Itemized Deduction 
As noted in Part II, if a coach was able to take a business 
expense deduction without any limitations for the payment (or deemed 
payment) of the buyout, there would be no tax concern. If the coach 
can classify the business expense deduction that he or she receives on 
account of the buyout payment as a non-itemized deduction19 rather 
than a miscellaneous itemized deduction, then the coach may fully 
 
the ‘true nature’ of the transaction to ensure that tax consequences are based upon a 
transaction’s actual substance and not mere labels.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 17.  See supra Part I (discussing three typical buyout scenarios that occur during the hiring 
of new college football coaches). 
 18.  Much of this discussion stems from an earlier piece. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 4.  
 19.  Non-itemized deductions are fully deductible under both the “regular” income tax and 
the Alternative Minimum Tax systems. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 56, 58, 63, 67, 68 (2012) (detailing 
taxable income and deductions under the regular income tax and the Alternative Minimum Tax).   
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offset the income recognized by the new university employer satisfying 
the buyout. This key issue involves the classification rules of Internal 
Revenue Code § 62. Under that provision, most trade or business 
expenses classify as non-itemized deductions. There is an exception for 
business expenses incurred by a taxpayer whose trade or business 
“consist[s] of the performance of services by the taxpayer as an 
employee.”20 Clearly, football coaches are employees of the university. 
There is an exception to the exception, however. An employee business 
expense reverts back to a non-itemized deduction if the employer 
reimburses such an expense.21 
Obviously, a coach is reimbursed for the expense of the buyout, 
but the reimbursement comes from the new employer. Thus, the new 
university employer reimburses the coach for an expense that the 
coach had prior to becoming an employee of the new university. That 
is, the employer reimburses the employee for an expense that was 
incurred while in the service of a different employer. The issue is 
whether that matters for purposes of § 62. 
The Treasury Regulation corresponding to § 62 states that the 
services must be provided by the employee in his capacity as an 
employee of the employer who reimburses the costs.22 This regulation 
should not be applied literally, however. To understand why, it is 
useful to examine why unreimbursed and reimbursed employee 
expenses are treated so differently for tax purposes. Congress is 
concerned that unreimbursed employee expenses might not be 
legitimate business expenses.23 If the expenses were legitimate, it is 
Congress’s position that then the employer likely would offer 
reimbursement.24 Thus, rather than completely disallow 
unreimbursed expenses, Congress set severe restrictions on their 
deductibility. 
 
 20.  26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(1) (2012).  
 21.  There is a requirement (satisfied in these cases) that the employee substantiate the 
expense. See Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(b). 
 22.  Id.: 
For purposes of determining “adjusted gross income,” section 62(a)(2)(A) allows an 
employee a deduction for expenses . . . paid by the employee, in connection with the 
performance of services as an employee of the employer, under a reimbursement or 
other expense allowance arrangement with a payor (the employer, its agent, or a third 
party).  
 23.  See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for Structural Change 
in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2005) (“Congress has opined that 
employers will reimburse any legitimate trade or business expense, thus implying that anything 
not reimbursed is not sufficiently related to the business and must have personal elements.”). 
 24.  See S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 79 (1996) (“The committee believes that generally it is 
appropriate to disallow deduction for employee business expenses because employers reimburse 
employees for those expenses that are most necessary for employment.”). 
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When an employer reimburses the expenses, the Service 
generally accepts this as third-party verification that the expenses 
were legitimate.25 Congress is willing to eliminate the limitations and 
classify the expenses as non-itemized when a third party (like the 
employer) has signaled that the expenses are valid. However, it is not 
enough merely that the employer reimbursed the expense because it is 
possible that the reimbursement may be a method of compensation. 
Thus, the expense must be related to the business of the employer. 
That is, the employer must have a valid business reason, other than 
compensating the employee, for reimbursing the expense.26 The 
expense must benefit the employer in some manner other than merely 
compensating the employee.27 
In the buyout context, the benefit to the new university 
employer is clear. In order to hire the coach, the buyout must be paid. 
The new university then has a direct benefit from the expense and it 
makes no difference that the payment also benefits the employee.28 
Thus, even though the new university employer reimbursed an 
expense that the coach incurred while employed elsewhere, the 
payment meets the policy behind granting non-itemized status. It is 
both reimbursed by the employer (satisfying the third party 
verification requirement) and it provides a substantial business 
benefit to the employer (functioning beyond mere employee 
compensation). As such, the payment by the coach to terminate the old 
employment contract should be classified as a non-itemized deduction. 
As a non-itemized deduction, it will completely offset the income 
recognized when the new university employer pays the former 
university employer or reimburses the employee for the buyout.29 
 
 25.  See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 717–21 (2007) (detailing situations in which employer-
reimbursed expenses are excludible and/or deductible).  
 26.  Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) suggests this with the language “in connection with the 
performance of services as an employee of the employer.” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a).  
 27.  The Service uses a similar construction involving Code § 132. In determining whether 
an exclusion for a working condition fringe benefit is applicable, the Service, citing language 
similar to the Code § 62 regulations requiring that the expense be incurred in connection with 
the employer who provides the benefit, stated that the requirement is satisfied when the 
employer “derives a substantial business benefit from the provision of the property or services 
that is distinct from the benefit that it would derive from the mere payment of additional 
compensation . . . .” Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51.  
 28.  It is also irrelevant that the Service requires the expense to be capitalized rather than 
immediately deducted. As universities are tax-exempt entities, it is not an issue whether it is 
deductible by the employer.  
 29.  Kahn & Kahn, supra note 4, at 542–49.  
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B. Incidental Third Party Beneficiary 
There is another policy justification for excluding the buyout 
payment from the coach’s income. The reasoning of this justification is 
illustrated by a simple example. Assume that a law student hopes to 
land a job in New York City. If the law student spends his own money 
traveling to New York in order to interview with a law firm, those 
travel expenses are not deductible. In contrast, if the law firm 
reimburses the law student (or directly pays) for the travel expenses, 
the student would not be required to include the reimbursement or 
payment in income.30 
These seemingly inconsistent results are nonetheless 
appropriate because the primary purpose behind the reimbursement 
or payment is to benefit the law firm. The law student obviously 
benefits as well (since he or she no longer has to pay for the travel 
expenses out of pocket), but the reimbursement is not meant to 
compensate the student. Instead, the firm spends the money in order 
to determine whether to hire the student and, if offered a job, to 
convince the student to accept it. While the student benefits, the law 
firm’s purpose is to benefit itself. 
The coach’s situation is analogous. While the coach obviously 
benefits from the new university employer’s paying for the buyout, the 
new university makes the payment not as compensation to the coach, 
but instead for valid business reasons to benefit the university. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The University of Texas’s arrangement of directly buying the 
University of Louisville coach’s employment contract does not relieve 
the coach’s tax requirement to include the buyout in income. In this 
situation, the Service can argue that the substance of the transaction 
overpowers its form. The Service will likely recharacterize the 
transaction as a payment of the buyout funds to the coach who uses 
the funds to pay the buyout to his old university employer. 
Despite this recharacterization, however, the payment by a 
university to buy out a new coach’s contract should not require the 
coach to include the payment in income. The payment should qualify 
as a non-itemized deduction since it functions beyond mere 
compensation and satisfies the third-party verification requirement. 
Further, such payment may incidentally benefit the coach, but its 
fundamental purpose is to benefit the new university employer. If 
either argument is accepted, a coach would not pay taxes on the 
 
 30.  Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177.  
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buyout. There may be other reasons to prefer to structure the buyout 
in this manner,31 but it will not improve the case for exclusion of 
taxable income to the coach. 
 
 
 31.  One possible explanation is that schools would prefer to not include the buyout 
payment amount as part of the compensation paid to the coach in the USA Today’s annual 
survey of compensation paid to NCAA coaches. For the compensation list, see 2014 NCAAF 
Coach Salaries, USA TODAY, available at http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/64H2-WLNC (last visited March 10, 2015 at 2:03 PM).   
